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In this paper we examine whether di⁄erent pension systems a⁄ect the set
of initial human capital conditions capturing an economy in a low steady state
equilibrium income. To analyze this problem, we employ a three period over-
lapping generations model where fertility and investments into the children￿ s
education are chosen endogenously. We show that education investments are
higher and start at lower income levels for a pay-as-you-go pension system econ-
omy compared to an informal, fertility related one. The income threshold needed
to escape the ￿poverty trap￿is therefore lower if a pay-as-you-go pension sys-
tem is employed. Moreover, unless the economy is caught in the low income
steady state, a pay-as-you-go pension system supports higher equilibrium in-
come. We further highlight that pension systems in￿ uence the timing of de-
mographic transition through their di⁄erent valuation of fertility, contributing
to the explanation for observed di⁄erences between developed and developing
countries.
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11 Introduction
Many countries around the world su⁄er from persistent underdevelopment. In
the year 2001 about 21% of the world population lived below the poverty line
of 1$/day (World Bank (2005)). While political and ecological reasons can
be responsible for this tragedy we are focusing on economic explanations. A
￿poverty trap￿ , the economic term for the situation of an economy captured in
a low equilibrium per capita income can be caused by a variety of factors like cor-
ruption, search externalities (Diamond (1982)), learning-by-doing externalities
(Brezis, Krugman, Tsiddon (1993)) or human capital externalities (Azariadis,
Drazen (1990)). Our work is focusing on the situation where a demographic
trap (Becker, Murphy, Tamura (1990)) is causing a situation where an economy
is caught in a vicious circle of low human capital and high population growth
which supports low equilibrium income and low education. Recent studies show
the importance of the amount of pension payments (Boldrin, De Nardi, Jones
(2005)) as well as the type of pension system (Groezen, Leers and Meijdam
(2003), Sinn (2004), Holler (2007)) on agents￿fertility decisions. We pick up the
idea that pension systems play an important role in fertility dynamics aiming
to analyze their e⁄ect on long-run per capita income and the income threshold
needed to escape a poverty trap.
By including a subsistence level of retirement consumption as in Galor and
Weil (2000), we reproduce the historically observed inverted U-shaped fertil-
ity dynamics corresponding to increasing income levels.1 This allows us to
additionally study the in￿ uence of di⁄erent pension systems on the timing of
demographic transition.
Starting point of our analysis is a model discussed by Ken Tabata (2003)
which emphasizes the importance of public education investments on human
capital accumulation and the possibility of being caught in a poverty trap. In
contrast to this paper we focus on the role of di⁄erent pension systems on
demographic transition and the determination of the human capital threshold
level needed to approach a high steady state equilibrium income.
To analyze the impacts of a change from one pension system to the other,
this paper is comparing equilibrium per capita income and fertility rates corre-
1Works by Dyson and Murphy (1985), Kremer (1993), Lucas (1999) and Lee (2003) give a
detailed explanation of fertility reactions along increasing income levels.
2sponding to an informally ￿nanced pension system and a pay-as-you-go pension
system. This enables us to answer the question whether the introduction of a
pay-as-you-go pension system can help developing countries to escape a poverty
trap. Additionally we check the viability of a fertility-related pension system in-
troduction to diminish a decrease in fertility rates and analyze the corresponding
cost.
In the past major changes in pension schemes were mainly due to socio-
logical or demographic changes. Bismarck￿ s social security system introduced
in 1889 was for example only a reaction to the brake of familial ties due to
the o⁄setting of industrial revolution. The generous pension schemes after the
second World War for almost all western welfare states were also a reaction to
missing contributions from a whole generation. This highlights that changes in
the pension scheme were not seen as a tool to change economic variables but
were only adjusted to the changing environment. Inspired by Wigger (1999)
who showed that public pension system contributions are crowding out private
gifts from children to their parents we assume that a public pension systems in-
troduction triggers a break for interfamily transfers from adults to the old. This
revises the causality between economic variables and pension design and shows
that it can be used as a tool in development economics. A variety of African
countries that are about to reform their pension systems could use this insight
not only to react on demographic changes but also to in￿ uence economic de-
velopment. As the ￿rst African country Nigeria performed in 2004 a structural
pension system reform by introducing a multi-pillar scheme with mandatory
pension contributions. Countries such as Kenya, Senegal and Uganda will soon
follow, showing that the political and social structure of the countries seems to
be mature enough to impose structured public pension systems.
Our work compares optimal education and fertility decisions for a traditional,
informally organized pension system economy with a public pay-as-you-go pen-
sion system economy. We choose to examine a pay-as-you-go pensions system
as - especially in developing countries - capital markets are not very well estab-
lished making a fully funded pension system di¢ cult to introduce. Note that
the results derived from our comparison would also be true if we exchanged
the unfunded with a funded pension system. Only the magnitude of the e⁄ects
would change. The break of intrafamily ties that takes place for any type of
public pension system is the reason for the lower marginal bene￿t of fertility
that drives our results.
32 The Model
We assume a standard neoclassical constant returns to scale production sector
for a small open economy. The interest rate is exogenously given and constant.
Capital is perfectly mobile implying that the capital labor ratio k and the wage
rate w are ￿xed and constant. The Diamond type OLG economy is populated
by ￿nitely living homogenous agents. Individuals live for three periods: child-
hood, adulthood and retirement. During childhood individuals consume ￿wht,
where ￿ is a ￿xed fraction of adult working time needed to rear one child and
ht is the amount of human capital an adult at period t is holding. Human
capital is determining the e⁄ectiveness of labor. Total working income wht is
therefore increasing in human capital. During adulthood households decide on
quantity nt and quality of children represented by education investments et.
Education and fertility decisions are implicitly determining the amount of sav-
ings st. Child quality investments are like quantity investments expressed as
working time cost. Following Galor and Weil (2000) we use a Cobb-Douglas
utility function which allows us to abstract from adult consumption without
changing the qualitative results. The population dynamics for the productive
adult population are described by Nt+1 = Ntnt. Retired people only consume
and have no in￿ uence on household optimization. They are assumed to use up
their whole savings plus pension bene￿ts. Bequests are therefore excluded from
the model.
We assume that individuals preferences are hierarchic in the sense that in-
dividuals draw utility solely from retirement consumption as long as a certain
subsistence level c > 0 is not secured. Utility from having children is only de-
rived if the adult income level supports retirement consumption above c. Along
the lines of De La Croix and Doepke (2003) we assume that adults are drawing
utility from the existence and the future human capital of their children which
is determining future adult income and well being.
Individuals utility is represented by the following logarithmic additive sepa-
rable function:
ut = ￿ log(ct+1) + (1 ￿ ￿)log(ntht+1) (1)
The discount factor ￿ which is assumed to be smaller than 1 is determining time
preference as well as adult altruism toward children.
Throughout the paper we refer to the second part of the utility function
which re￿ ects the consumption good value of a child as the altruistic value of
4child investments. While the word altruism implies that actions are made de-
spite own utility considerations which is not the case in our model we stick
to the word to pay tribute to earlier work we are building upon. Next to the
consumption good motive of fertility we additionally model the old age secu-
rity motive of fertility by incorporating ascending altruism (Wigger (1999)).
Following Morand (1999) ascending altruism of individual￿ s preferences is cap-
tured through gifts from adult children to their parents during retirement. The
ascending altruistic part of preferences is therefore captured in the composition
of pension payments ￿t+1 provided for the third period of life. Inspired by
the ￿intergenerational ￿ ow theory￿(Caldwell (1982)) we assume that ascend-
ing altruism is only present for countries without a mandatory public pension
system.2 Two di⁄erent pension system scenarios are examined.
Informal pension system: This scenario is describing the situation of
developing countries where children are socially responsible for the wellbeing
of their retired parents. Pension bene￿ts are therefore dependent on own fer-
tility decisions. Nevertheless the pension contributions are socially mandatory
(World Bank (1991)) we use the terminology of ascending altruism to describe
the private intrafamilial transfer from adult children to their old parents. The
transfers ￿ are assumed to be lump sum. We further assume that the pension




Pay-as-you-go pension system: This case examines economies with a
functioning public mandatory pay-as-you-go pension system. In the absence of
bequests old age support is the only motivation for private interfamilial gifts.3
If the state takes over the role of supporting the old generation private gifts are
therefore fully crowded out. A mandatory public pension system further implies
that pension payments do not depend on individual fertility but on average
fertility of the whole economy nt. Due to the nature of a pay-as-you-go pension
system being managed by a public authority bureaucracy and corruption cost
arise. In order to capture this especially for developing countries important
2A more detailed description of this argument is provided by Holler (2007).
3Positive bequests would lead to children contributing to their parents pensions through
private gifts in expectation of bequests from their parents at the end of their lives. For a
detailed description of the di⁄erent bequest motives see Zhang and Zhang (2001) or (WB
1991).
5fact, we introduce the parameter B 2 (0;1) capturing the e¢ ciency of the
public pension system in our pension formula. High bureaucracy or corruption




We start by considering an e¢ cient system with B = 1. In subsection 6 we
will relax this assumption and discuss its implications. Adults endowed with a
human capital level ht divide their after tax income htw ￿￿ between child cost
(rearing cost ￿nthtw + child education cost etnthtw) and savings since they
do not draw utility from consumption when adult. The adulthood budget is
therefore constrained by:
whtnt(￿ + et) + ￿ + st 6 wht (2)
Retirement consumption is ￿nanced through the value of savings at period
t+1 plus pension bene￿ts. Agents consume their whole retirement income since
we assume that bequests are zero. Following Galor and Weil (2000) minimum
retirement consumption is limited by a subsistence level c that secures survival
when old.
ct+1 = Rst + ￿t+1 (3)
ct+1 > c (4)
Economic growth is solely determined by the evolution of human capital
over time. Following Tabata (2006) human capital accumulation is determined
by education investments, adult human capital level ht and productivity of the
education sector determined by the parameters a;b;￿ and ￿.
ht+1 = ￿(a + betht)￿;￿;a;b > 0;0 < ￿ < 1 (5)
Adult human capital is entering the accumulation formula to capture the
positive in￿ uence of parental human capital on the child￿ s future skills. The
positive a parameter is securing that future human capital is positive in the
case of zero education investments. Since ￿ is smaller than one each additional
unit of education investment pays less in terms of additional future human
capital.
6Equation (1) subject to (2), (3), (4) and (5) describe the household opti-
mization problem. For su¢ ciently high income supporting consumption above
the subsistence level the optimization leads to ￿rst order conditions 1 to 4. Su-

















































Adults can either invest in child quantity (nt) or child quality (et). At the
optimum, marginal bene￿t of the investments have to equal marginal cost. FOC
1 and 3, describing optimal education decisions for both pension systems, state
that the marginal value of education measured in terms of additional future
human capital has to equal marginal cost of education measured in terms of
retirement consumption. In other words at the point where marginal altru-
istic utility of additional future child income equals marginal cost of reduced
retirement consumption education investments are optimal. Optimal Fertility
decisions covered in FOC 2 and FOC 4 demand that marginal cost of a child
are equal to marginal bene￿ts. FOC 2 further shows that marginal child utility
is split into an altruistic and a retirement consumption part for the informal
pension system. This is due to the existence of positive intrafamilial gifts. For
an economy with a pay-as-you-go pension system marginal child utility is solely
determined by altruism (see FOC 4). The ￿rst order conditions further highlight
that for both pension system cases, a quality quantity trade-o⁄ ￿ la Becker and
Barro (1988), is in place. High investments in child education are implying low
fertility and vice versa.
After describing the situation of relatively high income levels, supporting
retirement consumption above or equal to the subsistence level, we focus toward
the low income cases. If income levels cannot support subsistence, retirement
consumption condition (4) becomes binding and optimal decisions are described
by FOC 5.
c = Rwht ￿ (whtR(￿ + et) ￿ ￿)nt ￿ ￿R (FOC 5)
72.1 Education
In the described model, education investments are solely driven by altruism
because they do not create any bene￿t in the form of retirement consumption.
Therefore we assume parents to choose positive education investments only if
parental income is supporting a retirement consumption level above subsistence.
In other words investments in the quality of children only take place if old age
survival is secured. The parameter assumptions connected to this assumption
are summarized in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 If a >
(R￿￿+c)b￿￿
Rw￿ the human capital level supporting the subsistence
level of consumption h is lower than the human capital level that supports posi-
tive education investments h for both pension systems.
To make things easier we skip the proof of Lemma 1 to subsection 2.3. Due
to our parameter assumptions we can observe two optimal education results de-








if ht 6 h
P










if ht 6 h
I




From optimal education decisions we follow that the threshold level needed
to make education decisions positive is di⁄erent for both pension systems.
Proposition 1 The positive education threshold h is higher for the informal




) implying that it takes higher income levels to
make education investments positive. From h
P
onwards pay-as-you-go education
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Optimal fertility decisions are again dependent on the level of adult income. Due
to our parameter assumptions, we have to di⁄erentiate between the following
8three cases. The ￿rst case of human capital below the subsistence threshold h
describes the situation where the subsistence retirement consumption assump-
tion is binding and education investments are zero. h 6 ht 6 h corresponds to
the second case where investments in child quality are still zero but the income
level is already high enough to lead to retirement consumption above the sub-
sistence level. The third case ht > h is re￿ ecting the situation of relatively high
human capital supporting positive education investments.
Based on the fact that average fertility is equal to individual fertility because
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P 6 ht 6 h
P
if ht > h
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if ht 6 h
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if ht > h
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From equation (5) and Proposition 1, we know that for income levels ht <
h
P
human capital is constant at ￿a￿. This enables us to directly compare optimal
fertility decisions for this income range. We follow that informal and pay-as-you-
go fertility are equal for income levels below the subsistence threshold (ht < h).
Optimal fertility results further imply that the income level needed to surpass







cRw￿ + R2w￿￿￿ ￿
p
4cR2w2(￿ ￿ 1)￿￿￿ + (cRw￿ + R2w￿￿￿)2
2R2w2￿￿
As long as income is below the threshold h, retirement consumption is con-
stant at c. In this case parents would like to give up retirement consumption
in order to have more children. This is not possible because retirement con-
sumption is at a level needed for survival and condition (4) becomes binding.
Implicitly the existence of this case demands that children are a costly invest-
ment. In other words opportunity cost of children have to be higher than ben-
9e￿ts (Rw￿h0 > ￿). If this would not be the case condition (4) could never
become binding because having more children would not decrease but increase
retirement consumption. The assumption that retirement consumption has to
be high enough to secure survival together with the fact that fertility has to be









We allow fertility for the lowest possible income level to be smaller than one.
In these cases adults can only secure old age survival by choosing fertility rates
less than 1. Our model therefore also captures income cases corresponding to
shrinking adult population due to a lack of resources. n0 < 1 is only possible if




As income increases and surpasses h agents enjoy retirement consumption
above the subsistence level. Education investments are still zero (h
P < ht <
h
P
). In this income range individuals use resources above the subsistence level
not only to have children but also to increase retirement consumption through
higher savings. Households therefore weight marginal utility of children against
marginal utility of consumption through higher savings (FOC 2 and FOC 4
with et = 0). Both pension systems still face the same level of human capital.
Comparing optimal decisions highlights that pay-as-you-go fertility is smaller
than informal fertility.
If the income level is high enough (ht > h) human capital starts to grow due
to positive education investments. The income level needed to impose positive
education investments and the amount of education investments is di⁄erent
for the two pension systems. From h
P
onwards pay-as-you-go human capital is
higher than informal human capital. This is the reason why a simple comparison
of informal and pay-as-you-go fertility decisions can not be performed for the
high income case. We skip this exercise to section 3 which focuses on a detailed
examination of fertility dynamics.
4If 0 > c￿+(R￿￿1)￿ : ht > ￿
Rw￿ >
c+R￿
Rw . Reformulation gives us ht ￿ ￿
Rw￿ 6 ht ￿
c+R￿
Rw
and Rw￿ht ￿ ￿ 6 ￿(Rwht ￿ c ￿ R￿) < Rwht ￿ c ￿ R￿. This shows that nt =
c+R￿￿Rwht
￿￿Rw￿ht
can only be smaller than 1 if 0 < c￿ + (R￿ ￿ 1)￿.
102.3 Consumption
Budget constraints (2) and (3) together with optimal education and optimal
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> ht > h
P
if ht > h
P
Proposition 2 A pay-as-you-go pension system economy demands lower in-
come levels to support consumption above a subsistence level than an informal





P and h = h
P. Informal retirement consumption
is therefore equal or bigger than subsistence retirement consumption (cI
t+1 =





(￿￿1)￿+Rw￿h = c). It follows that R￿(wh ￿ ￿) >
R
2w￿￿h(wh￿￿)
(￿￿1)￿+Rw￿h . Reformulation gives us 1 >
Rw￿h
(￿￿1)￿+Rw￿h. Because the right
hand side of this expression is bigger than 1, h
I 6 h




At low income levels retirement consumption is constant at the subsistence
level. As a certain income threshold is surpassed individuals start to increase
consumption. Lower income levels are needed to increase pay-as-you-go retire-
ment consumption above c than in the informal case. The result is driven by
the fact that marginal bene￿t of having a child is lower for the pay-as-you-go
pension system since pension bene￿ts are independent on own fertility decisions.
Therefore for each income level the demand for children is lower than in the in-
formal pension system making it easier for retirement consumption to increase
a subsistence level. All income levels above h
P support higher retirement con-
sumption for a pay-as-you-go pension system economy. This is the case because
savings are higher due to lower fertility investments.
Through the help of the already derived insights we are now in the position
to proof Lemma 1 which is securing that education investments only take place
if income surpasses the subsistence level of consumption.













, h 6 h is true if h
I < h
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Education investment and fertility decisions are fully describing the behavior of
savings. Nevertheless in order to completely describe the model we produce the













if ht 6 h
P
if h
P 6 ht 6 h
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if ht 6 h
I
if h
I 6 ht 6 h
I
if ht > h
I
Corresponding to fertility decisions informal and pay-as-you-go savings are
equal for income levels below the pay-as-you-go subsistence threshold h
P and
lower for the range h
P < ht < h
P
because informal fertility is higher. Due to
the fact that ht is di⁄erent for human capital levels larger than h
P
a simple
direct comparison of the optimal decisions for this high income range can not
be performed.
2.5 Human Capital Accumulation and the Poverty Trap
Now we are focuse on the di⁄erences in human capital accumulation due to
di⁄erences in education investments for the two pension systems. Equation (5)
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if ht > h
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Notice that in our framework pay-as-you-go pension contributions are not
reducing investments in human capital. Depending on the parameter values the
described model has di⁄erent steady state equilibria. We focuse on the case of
a poverty trap5 since we wish to observe whether the di⁄erent pension systems
have an in￿ uence on the income level needed to escape the low long-run per
capita income equilibrium.





























> a > (b￿￿￿)
1
1￿￿ the model generates two stable
and one instable steady state equilibria for both pension systems. Initial income
lower than the poverty trap threshold h
P
trap leads to steady state equilibria that
equal each other for both pension systems. If initial human capital levels are
higher or equal to h
P
trap a pay-as-you-go public pension system supports a higher
steady state equilibrium than the informal pension system.
Proof. The assumption a > (b￿￿￿)
1
1￿￿ implying that ￿a￿ < h
P
secures that a
stable low income steady state (E1) exists for both pension system cases because
￿1(h) intersects the 45￿ line. Now rearrange ￿I
2(h) = h to separate a linear and
































. Now compare the functional value of the two curves at h
0
. If the
functional value of the power function is lower than the functional value of the
line R(h) intersects L(h) twice because R(0) > 0 and
@R(h)
@h > 0. These two inter-
sects are also solutions to ￿I
2(h) = h implying that ￿I
2(h) has two intersects with











































The lower steady state equilibrium (EI
2) is unstable, the higher one is stable
(EI
3). Pay-as-you-go education investments are always higher than informal
ones. Therefore the described parameter restrictions also produce an unstable
steady state equilibrium (EP
2 ) and a stable steady state equilibrium (EP
3 ) for the
5Situation where at least two stable (one low and one high) and one unstable steady states
exist. The variable value supporting the unstable equilibrium forms a threshold in reaching
the high stable steady state equilibrium.
13pay-as-you-go pension system. The last step of the proof secures the existence
of E2 and E3. In order to exist, the corresponding human capital levels have























Proposition 4 A pay-as-you-go pension system economy is featured by a smaller
set of initial income conditions supporting a poverty trap equilibrium because the






As long as income is below the education threshold h
P
both pension sys-
tems have an identical steady state equilibrium at h￿ = ￿a￿. From h
P
onwards
pay-as-you-go human capital is bigger than informal human capital because
education investments are always higher in the pay-as-you-go case (see Propo-
sition 1). The unstable steady state equilibrium determining the poverty trap
threshold level (htrap) is therefore lower for the pay-as-you-go case (EP
2 < EI
2).
Additionally the stable pay-as you go positive education steady state is higher
EP
3 > EI





to approach an even higher stable steady state in the case of a pay-as-you-go
pension system. Figure 1 fully describes the behavior of both human capital
accumulation equations and the corresponding equilibria.













14As long as education investments are zero future human capital of both
pension systems is constant and equal (EP
1 = EI
1). As income determining
human capital reaches the positive education threshold (h) which is lower for
the pay-as-you-go case, future human capital starts to rise. If initial human
capital is below (above) the level htrap which is corresponding to E2 the economy
approaches the stable low (high) steady state equilibrium E1(E3). Throughout
the literature initial human capital lower than htrap is known as a ￿poverty
trap￿scenario.
Besides the described 3 steady state ￿poverty trap￿scenario di⁄erent para-
meter values support a variety of equilibria6. While we do not examine each case
in detail, one can state that all cases with di⁄erent stable equilibria support a
lower poverty trap threshold for the pay-as-you-go pension system. All income
levels above this threshold lead to higher long-run per capita income for the
pay-as-you-go pension system. This is the case because education investments
start at lower income levels and are always higher in the pay-as-you-go case
because marginal utility of procreation is lower.
Proposition 5 For all possible parameter values supporting di⁄erent stable
equilibria the set of initial conditions leading to a stable high equilibrium is larger
for an economy with pay-as-you-go pension system compared to an economy with
an informally ￿nanced pension system. All parameter values corresponding to
a stable steady state equilibrium which is di⁄erent to h￿ = ￿a￿ lead to higher
long-run per capita income for the pay-as-you-go case. Only if ￿a￿ is the unique
stable steady state equilibrium both pension systems imply the same long-run per
capita income.
After the comparison of equilibria and connected thresholds we focus on the
role of pension systems for demographic transition.
3 Demographic Transition
While the term demographic transition describes the behavior of fertility and
mortality over time we only focus on fertility dynamics. Following other eco-
nomic studies we substitute time for income because historically, income is in-
creasing over time. One can observe that income and fertility are positively
6Examples of further existing cases can be examined in Apendix A.
15related for low income regions while the opposite is true for high income re-
gions7. In order to enable our model to cover the empirical fact that fertility
rates are negatively dependent on income increases for high income levels, we
assume that parameters satisfy
R￿ + ￿ + ￿ < 1 + ￿￿: (6)
This additional parameter assumption enables our model to nicely cover the
pattern of historic fertility dynamics for the three income cases ht 6 h;h 6
ht 6 h and ht > h.
3.1 Malthusian State: ht 6 h
This low income scenario describes the situation where the subsistence level of
retirement consumption assumption is binding. Because individuals primarily
have to secure their survival and use income above the subsistence level only
to procreate, education investments are zero. The term Malthusian state well
describes this situation because additional income is directly translated to higher
fertility while consumption per capita stays constant. To prove that this is the









Rw((R￿ ￿ 1)￿ + ￿c)
(￿ ￿ Rw￿ht)
2 > 0












2R2w2￿((R￿ ￿ 1)￿ + ￿c)
(￿ ￿ Rw￿ht)
3 < 0
Proof. As already explained, initial fertility is assumed to be lower than 1
implying that c￿ + (R￿ ￿ 1)￿ > 0. Therefore @nt




For low income levels our model reproduces the Malthusian view of an econ-
omy that cannot prosper because income increases are only used for additional
procreation. As already outlined fertility is equal for both pension systems if
retirement consumption is ￿xed at c. In this economic stage only the thresh-
old level of income needed to support consumption above the subsistence level
depends on the pension system. A lower level of income is needed to induce
7For a detailed description of the Demographic Transition see for example Lee 2003.
16additional savings for the pay-as-you-go pension system due to the fact that
marginal bene￿t of fertility is lower. This translates to lower fertility and higher
savings thus enabling consumption to surpass the subsistence level at a lower
income level.
3.2 Post-Malthusian State: h ￿ ht ￿ h
At the level h income becomes su¢ ciently high to support an optimal amout
of children under the constraint of a minimum retirement budget at the subsis-
tence level. This is implying that marginal utility of fertility and savings are
equal. Agents still do not contribute working time to educate their children.
Income increases drive down marginal utility of children because marginal cost
of children, a ￿xed part of adult income, is also increasing. Therefore di⁄erent
to the Malthusian state during this economic stage additional income leads to
lower fertility rates because the alternative investment opportunity of additional
retirement consumption through higher savings becomes more attractive. Cal-
culate the ￿rst order derivative of fertility with respect to human capital and
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(￿ ￿ Rw￿ht)
2 < 0
The second derivative further show that for both pension systems the decrease
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2R2w2￿(1 ￿ ￿)(R￿ ￿ 1)￿
(￿ ￿ Rw￿ht)
3 > 0
As already mentioned, children pay less in the pay-as-you-go pension system
leading to higher opportunity cost of not investing in savings. Therfore an
economy with a pay-as-you-go pension system enters the Post-Malthusian state
at lower income levels than economies with informal pension systems. Lower
marginal bene￿t of fertility for the pay-as-you-go pension system further leads
to lower demand for children and higher savings.
The combination of the Malthusian and Post-Malthusian state without edu-
cation investments already outlines the main features of demographic transition:
Income increases lead to increasing (decreasing) fertility for low (high) income
regions.
173.3 Post-Malthusian State with positive education invest-
ments: ht > h
Now education investments become positive. During this stage of economic
development fertility is not only competing against additional retirement con-
sumption but also against investments in the quality of children. From the ￿rst
order derivative of fertility with respect to human capital together with equation
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(aRw + b￿ ￿ bRw￿ht)2 < 0







2b2R2w2￿(￿ ￿ 1)(￿ ￿ 1)(￿aRw + b(R￿ ￿ 1)￿)
(aRw + b￿ ￿ bRw￿ht)3 > 0
Proof. Plug in h
I
which is the smallest viable human capital level connected
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t > 0. This is also true
for all human capital levels larger than h
I
.
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2b2R2w2￿(￿ ￿ 1)(￿ ￿ 1)(￿aRw + b(R￿ ￿ 1)￿)
(aRw+b(￿￿1)(￿￿1)￿￿Rw a
￿)3 .
The numerator of the expression is negative implying that the second derivative
is positive if a >
b￿￿(1￿￿)
Rw . From the minimum initial human capital constraint
we can follow that h
P
> ￿




Rw has to be true and the second derivative is positive.
Now we are in the position to compare pay-as-you-go and informal fertility




@ht < 0 we follow
that income levels above the pay-as-you-go education threshold h
P
support
lower fertility for the pay-as-you-go pension system.
Proof. We distinguish between two cases: h
I
> ht > h
P
and ht > h
I
. Simple
algebraic reformulation of optimal fertility decisions shows that for the ￿rst case
pay-as-you-go fertility evaluated at the point h
P
is lower than informal fertility.
Because fertility is decreasing with increasing human capital and human capital
is always higher for the pay-as-you-go pension system, all income levels in the
range support lower pay-as-you-go fertility. Comparison of optimal fertility
results for the income range ht > h
I
again shows that fertility is lower in the
pay-as-you-go pension system if human capital levels equal each other. Because
fertility is again negatively dependent on human capital which is higher for the
pay-as-you-go pension system, we can state that pay-as-you-go fertility is lower
than informal fertility for all human capital levels above h
P
.
Proposition 6 Pay-as-you-go fertility is equal to informal fertility for all in-
come levels below the pay-as-you-go subsistence threshold h
P. At the income
level h both pension systems reach their fertility maximum. Pay-as-you-go fer-
tility is lower than informal fertility for income levels above h
P.
As already discussed, the positive education threshold levels depend on the
pension system. Positive pay-as-you go education investments are supported
by lower human capital levels than informal education investments. The lower
threshold is again based on the lower marginal bene￿t of a child in the pay-as-
you-go pension system making it easier for education investments to compete. If
the threshold is surpassed, higher income leads to higher education investments



































For all income levels above the pay-as-you-go education threshold, agents
allocate more time to child quality in the pay-as-you-go pension system case. As
19income is increasing the di⁄erence in education investments of the two pension









The three analyzed income cases also cover information on the observed
di⁄erences in the timing of demographic transition between developing and de-
veloped countries.
Proposition 7 The introduction of a mandatory pay-as-you-go public pension
system to a country with an informal, fertility related pension system shifts
down the inverted U-shaped demand for children connected to income increases.
Therefore lower levels of income support an escape of the ￿rst stage of demo-
graphic transition where income increases lead to increasing fertility.
Lucas (2002) shows that while the demographic transition in the USA and
Western Europe already started at the end of the 19th century it took until the
1950s to start in the African countries. While of course several factors connected
to the industrial revolution like mortality declines play a role in explaining the
di⁄erent timing of demographic transition, the introduction of a public pension
system that ￿rst took place in 1889 in Germany appears to play a signi￿cant
role.
Our model also suggests that developing countries aiming to reduce pop-
ulation growth should introduce a pay-as-you-go pension system as one pillar
of their pension scheme. The fertility reduction is additionally accompanied
by a lower income threshold needed to escape a poverty trap equilibrium (see
proposition 4).
Proposition 8 Post-Malthusian income levels support a trade-o⁄ between fer-
tility and per capita income. A shift from a pay-as-you-go public pension sys-
tem to a fertility related informal pension system increases fertility rates but
decreases long-run per capita income.
Countries experiencing strong fertility declines due to income increases can
weaken the e⁄ect, by introducing a fertility related clause in their pension
scheme. While such a policy will increase the demand for children, long-run
per capita income will decrease, highlighting the existing trade-o⁄ between fer-
tility and per capita income.
The following subsection presents a numerical example to additionally clarify
and summarize fertility dynamics.
203.4 Numerical example
The last subsection already produced all necessary insights to compare the fer-
tility rates of the two pension systems for all development stages. Additionally,
we are already able to outline the behavior of fertility over time. The last miss-
ing insight to fully describe fertility dynamics is the di⁄erence in the strength
of fertility reductions observed connected to income increases for the two Post-
Malthusian stages. Because an analytic comparison of the partial derivatives
does not produce a clear result, a numerical example is performed.
Parameter values are set to satisfy the parameter conditions of a multiple
equilibria case (see Proposition 3).8
Figure 2: Fertility dynamics










For very low human capital levels, income is too low to secure old age sur-
vival. Individuals do not procreate at all and the population becomes extinct
in one generation. We excluded these cases (ht < 0:024) from our analysis by
assuming that initial human capital is high enough to produce positive fertility.
Due to hierarchic preferences only income above the level needed to secure a
subsistence level of retirement consumption is invested in procreation. In the
8Parameter values are set to:
a b w R c ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
0:027 5 100 1:0420 1:6 0:9920 0:075 1 0:6 0:1
21low income region (0:024 ￿ hI
t ￿ 0:029;0:024 ￿ hP
t ￿ 0:028) marginal utility of
fertility is larger than marginal utility of retirement consumption. Individuals
would like to give up retirement consumption in order to have more children
which is not possible since retirement budget is already at a minimum. In other
words, life-time income is too low to equal marginal utility of both investment
opportunities. As human capital is increasing, the cost of having children is also
increasing. This, together with higher fertility drives down the marginal bene￿t
of procreation. At the human capital level h (h
P = 0:028;h
P = 0:29) individual
income is high enough to equal marginal utility of fertility and savings. Fur-
ther income increases reduce marginal utility of fertility by higher marginal cost.
The income level equalizing marginal utility of fertility and retirement consump-
tion is lower for the pay-as-you-go pension system since the marginal bene￿t of
children is lower. Additional income further drives down marginal utility of





the marginal bene￿t of education equals the marginal bene￿t of the two other
investment opportunities and education investments become positive. The in-
come level needed to make education a competing investment is lower in the
pay-as you-go pension system since marginal bene￿t of children is lower. Posi-
tive child quality investments increase the increasing e⁄ect of higher income on
the marginal cost of fertility resulting in an even stronger decline of fertility.
4 Bureaucracy and Corruption
Transferring income from the working generation to retirees via a public system
clearly causes cost. While part of these are transparent such as operating cost,
others like bureaucracy or corruption are di¢ cult to measure. These costs are
country speci￿c and can be considered especially signi￿cant for least developed
countries, where legal security is low and corruption is soaring. While informal
decisions are equal to the former case, positive bureaucracy cost (B < 1) change
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The new results highlight that for income levels below the pay-as-you-go
subsistence threshold h
P fertility in the pay-as-you-go pension system is now
lower than fertility in the informal pension system. Retirement consumption is
still ￿xed at c. The utility generated by an informal pension system economy
is therefore higher than for a pay-as-you-go pension system economy. Income
levels supporting a post-malthusian state are still lower for the pay-as-you-go
pension system economy but the di⁄erence is decreasing if bureaucracy costs
are increasing. This is due to the fact that lower B drives down life time income
translating into higher income increases needed to equal marginal utility of
retirement consumption and fertility. Income levels above h
P lead to pay-as-you-
go retirement consumption above the subsistence level. From a certain income
level onward the e⁄ect on retirement consumption becomes strong enough to
compensate for lower fertility and the pay-as-you-go pension system becomes
again utility maximizing.
Proposition 9 A traditional, informal pension system is optimal if income lev-
els are very low or bureaucracy costs are large.
By including B < 1 our model covers income cases where an informally
￿nanced pension system is dominating a publicly ￿nanced pay-as-you-go scheme.
This underlines that country speci￿c conditions have to be considered in deciding
whether the introduction of a public pension system is a viable development
device.
5 Conclusion
Through the comparison of a pay-as-you-go and an informal pension system we
show that the type of pension system has an impact on economic development
and population growth. The introduction of a public pension system breaks
the link between individual fertility and pension bene￿ts that can be observed
for traditional societies. Marginal bene￿t of procreation is therefore lower for
the pay-as-you-go pension system, leading to lower demand for children. Re-
￿ ecting on the quantity/quality trade o⁄, pay-as-you-go education investments
are higher and start at lower income levels. This is the reason why economic
23take-o⁄ to a high long-run equilibrium per capita income is supported by lower
income levels for a pay-as-you-go pension system economy. Next to the lower
poverty trap threshold, education investments under the pay-as-you-go pension
scheme which exceed informal ones, imply larger per capita income for the high
steady state equilibrium.
A switch from an informal- to a pay-as-you-go pension system leads to de-
creasing marginal utility of fertility, increasing high steady state equilibrium
income and a possibility to escape a poverty trap. Nevertheless, if bureaucracy
costs are considered, the described positive e⁄ects of a pay-as-you-go pension
system can be accompanied by a reduction in utility for very low income or high
corruption cases. Countries experiencing a ￿Malthusian stage￿of their econ-
omy with human capital levels below the pay-as-you-go subsistence threshold
are worse o⁄ if a public pension system is introduced. This result is supported
by even higher income levels if bureaucracy costs are soaring.
In addition, we show that developed countries facing a sharp decrease in
fertility can weaken this e⁄ect by introducing a fertility related clause in their
pension scheme. While such a policy could absorb part of the negative demo-
graphic trend it comes at a cost of reduced long run equilibrium per capita
income.
Our results further underline that a pay-as-you-go pension system needs a
lower income level to escape the ￿Malthusian stage￿of an economy because in-
vestments, contrary to fertility, are more competitive. This allows us to conclude
that pension systems appear to play a vital role in the timing of demographic
transition. The divergence of pension systems for developed and developing
countries can therefore partly explain the observed regional di⁄erences in the
behavior of population dynamics.
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